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"Whatever is not nailed down is mine," reportedly said Colis P. Hunting-,
ton, one of the great nineteenth century robber barons. "Whatever I can pry
loose is not nailed down." In any community, th"ere are two basic ways of
dealing with the generic problem of robber barons, freebooters, and pillagers.
The fIrst, the "individual method," leaves responsibility for protection to each
individual or family unit, which must then maintain its own operational arse-
nal, adequate for the dangers it anticipates. This method is inherently ineffi-
cient, for a pillager will always fInd some target that is weaker, while fear of
the pillager will cause all others to over-invest in defense in order to ensure
their security. The second, the "collective method," involves pooling the
resources of the entire community and establishing a credible system in which
an attack on anyone member will be viewed as an attack on all -- an attack
to which all will respond.
The collective method is more efficient, for if there is a general pooling
of resources and the commitments are credible, the collective strength of the
whole is always greater than any of its parts. "Bad men," to paraphrase
Holmes, people untroubled by the law and prepared to use violence to enrich
themselves or aggrandize their power, will think twice and desist. The collec-
tive method deters freebooters.
For almost a century, the international political system has sought to install
the collective method as its way of maintaining security. With the awful
experience of the Second World War fresh in their minds, the victors sought
to create a workable system of collective security in which all states would
agree beforehand to cooperate in resisting aggression. Under the United
Nations Charter, the Security Council, with a core permanent membership of
the strongest states of the world, was assigned the task of determining when
the world community had to "resist aggression by force. Chapter VII of the
Charter authorized the Security Council to decide in each case which measures,
whether involving the use of armed force or not, might be necessary to restore
or maintain international peace. Article 43(1) provided that:
All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of
international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security
Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements,
t Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School. This comment is the text
of a speech delivered at the University of New Mexico in Albuquerque on January 14, 1991. The author
gratefully acknowledges the comments and help of Myres McDougal and Andrew Willard.
203
HeinOnline -- 16 Yale J. Int’l L.  204 1991
Yale Joumal of International Law Vol. 16:203, 1991
armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for
the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.1
Planning for these contingencies was to be undertaken by a Military Staff
Committee, comprised of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the
Council. Article 48 required members of the United Nations to carry out the
collective security decisions of the Security Council.2
The UN Charter also contemplated contingencies in which the Security
Council would be unable to operate and provided for a backup collective
security system, based on customary international law. Article 51 provided:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security.3
Under article 51, states were still authorized to respond to the request of a
beleaguered state and to participate in its self-defense, but, obviously, the
clarity of international authority and condemnation would always be less in
actions authorized under article 51 than in actions taken under Chapter VII.
If the primary system for collective self-defense could work, it was obviously
preferable to the backup system.
The term "collective security" may sound rather bellicose but, in fact, it
is a precondition of many of the benefits we associate with peace. Only when
a collective security system works do otherpeaceful measures become feasible:
genuine arms control, varying degrees of disarmament, the prohibition of
certain types ofweapons, such as chemical and biological weapons, and "peace
dividends" for taxpayers. All of these measures presuppose the operation of
a system of collective security. If this type of system does not work, every
nation must look to its own resources. Arms races, weapons proliferation,
shifting alliances, and the expectation of violence will increase.
The Cold War, with its rivalry between the United States and the Soviet
Union, paralyzed the institutional collective security system of the United
Nations. Collective security actions under article 51 were always, by their very
nature; controversial. But with the end of the Cold War and the beginning of
an entente between the United States and the Soviet Union, high hopes were
expressed in many parts of the world that the United Nations would finally
function as originally intended. It was neither grandiose nor foolish to believe,
as George Bush said, that this was an opportunity to begin to build a new
world order.
The Emirate of Kuwait and many other relatively small and weak states
rely, in some measure, on the expectation that the United Nations Charter and
its collective security system will protect their territorial integrity and political
1. U.N. CHARTER art. 43, para. 1.
2. ld. at art. 48.
3. ld. at art. 51.
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independence. The dictator of Iraq and others like him rely on exactly the
opposite expectation, that the collective security system of the United Nations
exists only on paper, in large part because the remaining superpower, the
United States, irremediably traumatized by the experience of Vietnam, may
have the military power, but will be politically ,incapable of undertaking the
military operations necessary to make the United Nations work. Although
President Bush mobilized the United Nations and placed an imposing and
apparently adequate military force in Saudi Arabia, the evidence is that Saddam
Hussein still believes that his expectation is well-founded. Hussein seems to
believe that no one will try to oust him militarily or, if they try, will stay the
course.
The outcome of the Iraqi aggression is uncertain. But whatever happens,
some important lessons can already be learned. Some are clear, while others
only direct us to further study.
I. LESSON ONE
The system of world order, as conceived in the United Nations Charter,
continues to depend centrally on the United States. The UN Charter provides
the authority and the framework for a collective security system, but it cannot
yet provide the energy or resources to make it work. In September 1990, the
Secretary-General himself, on his own initiative, undertook a diplomatic
demarche visiting Amman, Jor~an in order to meet with the Iraqi Foreign
Minister, Tariq Aziz. After two days of fruitless talks, Perez de Cuellar left,
announcing that his effort failed and that the matter now rested in the hands
of the superpowers.
What he meant was that it was in the hands of the United States. World
politics is still marked by a number ofpower centers, most ofwhich apparently
still see their own interests served by accommodating international aggressors
(except when aggression is targeted at them) rather than by trying to protect
the collective security system itself. With the exception of the United King-
dom, no other major state -- be it the Soviet Union, China, France, Japan, or
Germany -- saw the Iraqi aggression as a systemic crisis. While some perma-
nent members of the Security Council may have initially viewed the Iraqi
action with alarm, none were able or willing to assume leadership and to spur
the Council into action. Two permanent members, the Soviet Union and the
People's Republic ofChina, while willing to join in verbal condemnation, were
openly reluctant to allow the Security Council to undertake or to authorize
coercive responses. On November 29, 1990, when the Council finally decided,
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